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Abstract
One of the fundamental questions in corporate finance is what determines firms’
financing decisions. Capital structure varies greatly among firms in the real world and, the
determinants of the capital structure still largely remained unexplained. In the traditional
financial theories, several approaches have been developed to explain how firms make their
financing decisions. Myers and Majluf (1984) introduced the asymmetric information approach
to explain corporate financing choices when managers are assumed to have inside information
that outside investors do not have. The pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers,
1984) describes that managers prefer internal over external financing and debt over equity if
external financing is needed. This occurs because managers perceive issuing equity to be overly
costly while perceiving issuing debt to be less costly and using internal funds to be costless. The
trade off theory states that the target debt ratio of the firm is determined by balancing debt tax
shields against financial distress costs (Myers, 2001). It predicts that large firms with tangible
assets tend to have higher leverage. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) examined the financing
behaviors of the 157 U.S. firms and found that debt issues were used to finance deficit of these
firms supporting the pecking order theory. Although the pecking order theory largely contributes
to explain how firms make financing choices empirical evidence has been to some extent
contradictory. For instance, previous studies found evidence that contradicts the pecking order
theory (Fama & French. 2002; Frank & Goyal, 2003, Goyal, 2007). Thus, more robust evidence
is required to explain why firms make different financing choices.
It is only recently that psychological and behavioral features have been considered as an
important factor in the corporate decision making processes. Roll (1986) contends in his hubris
theory that managerial overconfidence could affect corporate decisions. Several other researchers
attempted to explain why optimal debt levels are not achieved in some firms by associating
managerial overconfidence with financing decisions (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier & Tate, 2005;
Malmendier et al., 2008). Specifically, several studies emphasized that overconfidence could
influence investment decision making processes. Hackbarth (2006) maintained that
overconfident CFOs tended to choose more aggressive debt policies because they underestimated
the volatility of their firms’ cash flows. Ben-David et al. (2007) associated overconfidence with
corporate policies and found that 1) overconfidence was positively related to debt leverage 2) the
use of long-term debt was higher for firms with overconfident CFOs. It is posited that
overconfident CEOs prefer debt over equity because they believe issuing new equity will
destruct the value of existing shareholders (Malmendier et al., 2007; Malmendier & Tate, 2005;
Heaton, 2002). Malmendier and Tate (2008) analyzed the effect of overconfidence on acquisition
decisions and found that overconfident CEOs perceived issuing equity to be costly even when
the valuations of their firms by investors were correct. In sum, it has been argued that
overconfident CEOs will display the preferences for debt over equity financing.

In this paper, therefore, we contend that managerial overconfidence could help us better
understand one of the fundamental questions in corporate finance; why firms choose different
capital structures. Further, we extend the previous studies on the financing decisions by
characterizing companies based on the pattern of capital structure in relation to manager
overconfidence. By characterizing the companies we expect to discover whether there is any
consistent pattern in capital structure and financial performance of hospitality firms with regard
to manager overconfidence. Therefore, the findings of this paper will fill a critical gap in the
hospitality literature on the capital structure and provide meaningful explanations for the use of
different financing means when considering behavioral aspects of management.
The data of this study will include publicly traded U.S. lodging and restaurant companies
between 1999 and 2009. In order to determine the relationship between overconfidence and
financing decisions a multiple regression will be conducted using debt-to-equity ratio as a
dependent variable. Our main independent variable is overconfidence. Malmendier and Tate
(2005) developed three overconfidence measures based on the personal portfolio decisions of
CEOs. We will use expense ratio as a proxy for agency cost in order to distinguish the effect of
overconfidence from traditional agency theory. Expense ratio is defined as operating expense
scaled by annual sales. Additionally, independent variables as proxied by the determinants of
capital structure such as size, profitability, and tangibility will be adopted from previous studies
(Titman & Wessels, 1988; Fama & French, 2002; Frank & Goyal, 2004). The following crosssectional time-series model will be used to analyze the relationships among variables.
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